Ərəb Baharının bilinən və bilinməyən tərəfləri- 1

Ərəb Baharının bilinən və bilinməyən tərəfləri- 1

Daxili səbəblər

Ərəb Baharı, (ərəbcə: الثورات العربية‎, - al-Thawrāt al- Arabiyyah), 21-ci əsrin  ən böyük xalq hərəkatıdır. 

Bu hərəkat həqiqətən Ərəb xalqlarının azadlıq və demokratiya uğrundakı mübarizasıdır mi? 

Yoxsa Böyük Ortadoğu Projesinin bir mərhələsidir ? 

Və ya neft əldə edilməsini rahatlaşması üçün yeni bir Ortadoğu planıdır ?

Bu suallara zehninizdə cavab axtarın.. hadisələrə bütövlükdə analiz edərək səbəb nəticə konteksində yanaşın..  

Ərəb Baharının səbəblərini daxili və xarici səbəblər olaraq qruplandıra bilərik..

Ölkələrin daxilindəki vəziyyət xalq hərəkatının yetişməsi və başlamasının əsasını təşkil edir.. 

Ərəb Baharının daxili səbəbləri demək olar ki, ölkələr üçün oxşardır.. 

1) həyat şəraitinin ağır olması

2) işsizlik

3) ərzaq qiymətlərinin yüksək olması

4) söz və mətbuat azadlığının olmaması

5) İnhisarçılıq.. gəlirli sahələrin müəyyən təbəqənin əlində cəmlənməsi

6) günlük gəlirin 2 ABŞ dollarından aşağı olması (60dollar aylıq)

7)  zənginlər ilə kasıblar arasında böyük fərqin olması.. aşağı əmək haqqı ilə yuxarı əmək haqqı arasındakı fərqlər

8) uzun müddət eyni adamın hakimiyyəti

9) seçkilərdə saxtakarlıq

10) polis və təhlükəsizlik orqanlarının təzyiqi və gücü ilə əhalinin daim qorxu altında saxlanılması

11) hakim təbəqəninin lüks həyat tərzi

12) rüşvət və korrupsiyanının geniş yayılması

13) vəzifədə olan nazir, millət vəkili və digər məmurların vəzifələrindən sui-istifadə ederək ölkənin büdcəsini talaması.. və b. səbəblər

British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring analysis

British Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring

The British government’s varied responses to the popular uprisings of the “Arab Spring” have been criticised for being inconsistent and/or selective. British actions ranged from providing substantial military support for the rebels in Libya to offering notably muted reactions to government suppression of protests in Bahrain.
On assuming office, the new foreign secretary, William Hague, suggested that Britain would have a networked approach to foreign policy with a greater awareness of the bilateral interests that Britain had with other countries around the world. This analysis offers a provisional examination of the security, economic, and societal networks that Britain holds with states in the Arab world and, in doing so, tests whether these have any correlation with the British government’s policy towards protests in the region.
The British government issued policy statements on each Arab country between 1 December 2010 and 31 December 2011.10 Predicate analysis identifies the social construction of each situation by British foreign policymakers and ascertains whether the British attitude towards the government or the protestors was positive, negative, or neutral. 
On this evidence, the British government formulated three main types of response to protests in each country: 
substantial support for the protesters; substantial support for the
regime; and no substantial commitment to either side. 
These categories summarise the British government’s overall disposition towards each situation rather than suggest British support for any particular policy.

The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations

The United Kingdom and U.S.-UK Relations

Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom (UK) as the United
States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors,
including a sense of shared history, values, and culture, as well as extensive and long-established
cooperation on a wide range of foreign policy and security issues.
The modern U.S.-UK relationship was forged during the Second World War. It was cemented
during the Cold War, as both countries worked together bilaterally and within the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. The United States and the
UK are two of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and both are
founding members of NATO. In the early 1990s, the UK was an important U.S. ally in the first
Gulf War, and the two countries later worked together in stabilization and peacekeeping
operations in the Balkans. The UK was the leading U.S. ally in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and
subsequent stabilization operations, remains the largest non-U.S. contributor to the NATO-led
mission in Afghanistan, and took a leading role in alliance operations in Libya in 2011. It is also
an important U.S. partner in efforts to pressure Iran over its nuclear activities, and to combat
international terrorism. The UK is the seventh-largest economy in the world and a major financial
center. The United States and the UK share an extensive and mutually beneficial trade and
economic relationship, and each is the other’s largest foreign investor.
U.S. and UK officials, from the cabinet level down, consult frequently and extensively on many
global issues. American and British diplomats report often turning to each other first when
seeking to build support for their respective positions in multilateral institutions or during times
of crisis, as in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. British input is
often cited as an element in shaping U.S. foreign policy debates. Some observers assert that a
common language and cultural similarities, as well as the habits of cooperation that have
developed over the years, contribute to the ease with which U.S. and UK policymakers interact
with each other. The term “special relationship” has often been used to describe the high degree
of mutual trust between the two countries in cooperating on diplomatic and political issues. The
special relationship also encompasses close intelligence-sharing arrangements and unique
cooperation in nuclear and defense matters.
In the minds of many Americans, the UK’s strong role in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past decade reinforced an impression of closeness and solidarity.
The 2010 UK election resulted in the country’s first coalition government since the Second World
War. The Conservative Party won the most votes in the election, and Conservative leader David
Cameron became prime minister. To command a parliamentary majority, however, the
Conservatives were compelled to partner with the Liberal Democrats, who came in third place,
and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg became deputy prime minister. The Labour Party, now
led by Ed Miliband, moved into opposition after leading the UK government since 1997.
Economic and fiscal issues have been the central domestic challenge facing the coalition thus far.
Seeking to reduce the country’s budget deficit and national debt, the coalition adopted a five-year
austerity program early in its tenure. With a double-dip recession in 2012 and low growth
forecasts, the government has been maintaining its austerity strategy under considerable pressure
and criticism. Austerity has also heightened social tensions and contributed to rising political
friction between the coalition partners. Although the coalition arrangement went smoothly during
its first year, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats have subsequently disagreed about a series
of domestic issues, including a number of proposed changes to the country’s political system.
Europe has been another source of tension. The UK has long been one of the most skeptical and
ambivalent members of the 27-country European Union (EU). While the Conservative Party
remains a stronghold of “euro-skeptics,” the Liberal Democrats are the UK’s most pro-EU
political party. The Eurozone crisis has deepened British antipathy toward the EU, fueling calls to
reclaim national sovereignty over issues where decision-making has been pooled and integrated
in Brussels. Some analysts believe that a British departure from the EU is a growing possibility;
Prime Minister Cameron intends to renegotiate some of the terms of membership and put the
UK’s relationship with the EU to a national referendum in 2017. Adding another note of
uncertainty to the British political landscape, Scotland plans to hold a referendum in September
2014 on whether to separate from the UK and become an independent country.
In recent years, some observers have suggested that the U.S.-UK relationship is losing relevance
due to changing U.S. foreign policy priorities and shifting global dynamics. An imbalance of
power in favor of the United States has occasionally led some British observers to call for a
reassessment of their country’s approach to the relationship. Despite such anxieties, most analysts
believe that the two countries will remain close allies that choose to cooperate on many important
global issues such as counterterrorism, the NATO mission in Afghanistan, efforts to curb Iran’s
nuclear activities, and global economic challenges.
Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in the UK and its relations with the
United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress.

Diktatorların aqibəti.. (1) Zeynalabdin ben Əli

Diktatorların aqibəti.. (1)

21ci əsrin ilk onilliyi ərəb ölkələrində diktatorların sonunun gəlməsi ilə yadda qalan oldu.
Ölkələrini illərlə hakimiyyətləri altında saxlayan tiranların devrilməsi heç də uzun müddət çəkmədi. Əhalini polis və hərbi güc ilə özünə tabe etdirən diktatorların qısa avtobioqrafiyasına diqqət etsək onları birləşdirən bir çox ortaq cəhət olduğunu görürük: hərbi sistemdən vəzifəyə gəlmələri..  uzun müddət hakimiyyətdə olmaları (ən az olanı 23 il).. ailə üzvlərinin lüks həyat tərzi.. ölkədəki bütün gəlirli sahələrdə inhisarçılıq.. seçkilərdə saxtakarlıq.. müxalifətə qarşı dözümsüzlük.. söz və mətbuat azadlığına qarşı olmaları.. və s. əslində burda ortaq cəhətləri artırmaq olar.. amma mən diktatolar haqda qısa məlumat vermək istəyirəm..

Zeynalabdin ben Əli 

Təvəllüdü:    3 sentyabr 1936 (80 yaş)
Hakimiyyəti: 7 noyabr 1987 — 14 yanvar 2011
1987ci il 1 oktyabrda Tunis daxili İşlər naziri vəzifəsinə təyin olunur.. 5 həftə sonra Həbib Burcibanı hakimiyyətdən uzaqlaşdırmış və Tunisin 2ci prezidenti olmuşdur. Ölkədəki bütün gəlirli sahələr ben Əli ailəsi və onlara yaxın vəzifədəki şəxslərin əlində cəmləşmişdi. Parçalanmış və zəif müxalifətin olmasından məmnun olan ben Əli çıxışlarının birində bu vəziyyəti belə izah edirdi "Partiyaların güclü və çox olması ölkəni zəiflədir, vaxt və enerji itkisidir.. düşmənçiliyə yol açır". (Murphy, 1999:190) 
Ərəb Baharına qədər Tunisdə keçirilən seçkilər azad və ədalətli adlandırılsada bir xüsusa diqqət etmək lazımdır 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 və 2009- cu illərdə keçirilən bütün seçkilərdə ben Əlinin partiyası böyük fərqlə "qələbə" qazanmışdır..
Həyat yoldaşı Leyla Trabelsinin nüfuzundan şəxsi sərvətin artırmaq istiqamətində istifadə etməsi.. lüks həyat tərzi ilə əhali arasında ona qarşı nifrətə səbəb olmuşdu.. (qeyd edək ki Leyla Trabelsi Fransadan xüsusi aşbazlar gətirmişdi).. ben Əli özündən sonra yerinə oğlunu hakimiyyətə gətirmək istəyirdi..

17 dekabr 2010-cu ildə Məhəmməd Buazzizinin haqsızlıq və məmur özbaşınalığına etiraz olaraq özünü yandırması ilə ben Əli iqtidarıa qarşı etirazlar başladı..Hadisələrin geniş ərazidə yayılması və xalq hərəkatı halını alması ilə 23 ildir ölkəni təkbaşına idarə edən diktator 14 yanvar 2011-ci ildə.. etiraz dalğasının 28-ci günündə ölkədən qaçdı. Ölkədən qaçarkən ben Əlinin yoldaşı 1.5 ton ağırlığında qızılı yanına aldığı da iddia edilir.. 
Ben Əli öncə Maltaya ordanda Fransaya getmək istəyirdi, ancaq Sarkozi qəbul etmədiyindən Səudiyyə Ərəbistanına qaçdı.. və beləliklə Tunisdə xalq qalib gəldi..

Ten Recommendations for the Next British Secretary of State for Defense

The following 10 recommendations sum up the most important issues facing the British defense establishment.

1. Rededicate Britain to the Atlantic Alliance

The U.S. is Britain’s most important ally—no other nation comes close. The alliance with the U.S. is both bilateral and, through NATO, multilateral. Because their forces fight alongside each other, interoperability is vital. Any relationship, commitment, or system of procurement that detracts from this close and vital relationship is a direct attack on the effectiveness of both British and American forces. Britain should stand firm against all EU-led efforts to subordinate the Special Relationship and NATO in all policy realms.

2. Recognize the True Purpose of the Armed Forces

In a democracy, the true purpose of armed forces is not simply to win wars but to prevent them by deterring adversaries. The argument that Britain can respond more effectively to the strategic challenges of the future by denuding its armed forces of supposedly Cold War era capabilities, and taking a “deterrence dividend” as a result, is a dangerous error that will lead to weaker forces that are less capable of fulfilling their true purpose. Britain’s armed forces should remain balanced and continue to hold an effective nuclear deterrent, not becoming exclusively dedicated to counter-insurgency warfare.

3. Demand Appropriate Spending Levels

In 1996, before Tony Blair entered office, Britain was at peace and spent 2.9 percent of GDP on defense. It is now at war and, in 2008, spent 2.2 percent. Britain’s armed forces cannot be restored to full health by further cuts. Yet over the next five years, defense spending is projected to fall by 6 percent annually.[1] Given the cuts already imposed on the Ministry of Defense and Britain’s commitment in Afghanistan, this is unacceptable. Over the next five years, defense spending should rise to at least 2.9 percent of GDP, thus restoring cuts made since 1996. The first priority for these funds should be to sustain and increase the strength and effectiveness of the British army.

4. Recognize That Britain’s Defense Industrial Base Is Global

No democracy, including the U.S., can supply its forces entirely with equipment produced at home. The purpose of defense procurement is simple: to procure equipment for defense. There is nothing wrong with foreign arms sales that serve Britain’s strategic interests, but the British defense industry should not be subsidized out of the defense budget simply for the sake of exports. Doing so would mean less money for the forces themselves. Instead, Britain should develop and buy efficiently and do so in collaboration with its closest operational partner.

5. Recognize That Procurement Reform Is Essential but Not a Silver Bullet

Last fall, the Gray Report made serious claims about the cost of inefficiencies in Britain’s procurement process. These claims should be investigated and appropriate reforms made. But procurement reform is a perennial issue, and there is no reason to believe that all of the supposed inefficiencies can be found and eliminated. Britain should not plan its defense spending on the assumption that future efficiencies will compensate for cuts today.

6. Conduct a Comprehensive Investigation into Contracting Out and Other Hidden Liabilities

When carried out efficiently, transparently, and with proper accounting procedures, contracting out makes sense. But serious questions have been raised about the value for money delivered by Labour’s use of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), and it is clear that PFI has not been properly accounted for. Nor is the publicly available information on PFI sufficiently transparent to allow the Commons to carry out its oversight duty. Britain should continue to contract out but do so responsibly.[2] This investigation into contracting out should be part of a broader examination of defense’s hidden financial liabilities, including those resulting from funding arrangements for the war in Afghanistan.

7. Reduce the Size and Cost of the Senior Civilian Levels of the Ministry of Defense

Under Labour, the size of the civilian side of the Ministry of Defense has shrunk dramatically. This is commendable. But the cost of that civilian side has grown nonetheless, as has the size of its senior levels. More and more expensive senior officials are supervising fewer and fewer of their cheaper juniors.[3] The size of the Ministry should be brought into balance to control current senior wage bills as well as future pension and related claims.

8. Resist International Initiatives That Will Damage Britain’s Ability to Defend Itself and Its Allies

Britain currently supports international initiatives that will prove seriously damaging to its defenses as well as its sovereignty. It is the leading campaigner for the U.N.’s Arms Trade Treaty, which will ultimately be used to curtail British arms sales to states such as Israel.[4] It is an advocate of the International Criminal Court, which is now contemplating defining a “crime of aggression” that would limit Britain’s ability to defend itself or to cooperate with the U.S.[5] Britain must take a strong stand against this transnational threat to its defense sovereignty.

9. Foster a Culture of Military Professionalism in the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense

The perception is widespread that the past government changed both the culture of the armed forces and the Ministry itself by devaluing the contributions of, and debate among, military professionals. It is a fact that the British occupation of Basra was a failure. The fate of British operations in Afghanistan is still in doubt. It may be politically convenient to emphasize Treasury oversight and a consultant culture instead of informed military judgment in Britain’s defense establishment, but such an approach is militarily suicidal. Within the context of civilian control of the forces, Britain should encourage military professionals to act as professionals.

10. Respect and Foster Commons Oversight

The House of Commons has a central role to play in the oversight of the Ministry of Defense and of all other ministries. This oversight will not be pleasant for the Secretary of State for Defense. But the Secretary nonetheless has an interest in the professional exercise of this oversight: the Commons embodies the sovereignty of the British people. Commons oversight should be frequent and sustained, and Defense officials—like all others—should foster such characteristics. It is noteworthy that few of these fundamental issues facing Britain’s armed forces have been the subject of serious inquiry by the House of Commons Defense Select Committee. That neglect should end.

Immense Challenges Ahead

The challenges facing the next British Secretary of State for Defense are immense. Of course, defense is only part of the broader problem of securing Britain, a problem the next government will have to address through a revised national security strategy. If the forces are to serve their limited but vital role in this strategy, they, and the broader defense establishment, should be restored to a central place in the concerns of the government and the House of Commons as a whole.

[1]Ted R. Bromund, “British Defense Cuts Threaten the Anglo–American Special Relationship,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2210, November 18, 2008, p. 5, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/11/British-Defense-Cuts-Threaten-the-Anglo-American-Special-Relationship.

[2]Ted R. Bromund, “Contracting Out in Defense: Lessons from the British Experience for the U.S. and Great Britain,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2278, May 28, 2009, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Contracting-Out-in-Defense-Lessons-from-the-British-Experience-for-the-US-and-Great-Britain.

[3]Ted R. Bromund, “Something Fishy in the Ministry of Defense,” The Foundry, January 8, 2010, at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/01/08/something-fishy-in-the-ministry-of-defense/.

[4]Ted R. Bromund and Steven Groves, “The U.N.’s Arms Trade Treaty: A Dangerous Multilateral Mistake in the Making,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2309, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/The-UNs-Arms-Trade-Treaty-A-Dangerous-Multilateral-Mistake-in-the-Making.

[5]Brett D. Schaefer and Steven Groves, “The U.S. Should Not Join the International Criminal Court,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2307, August 17, 2009, p. 18, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/Executive-Summary-The-US-Should-Not-Join-the-International-Criminal-Court.

Birləşmiş Krallığın xarici siyasətinin əsas prioritetləri

Birləşmiş Krallığın xarici siyasətinin əsas prioritetləri aşağıdakılardır:
* ölkənin təhlükəsizliyinin təmin edilməsi;
* Birləşmiş Krallığın enerji daşıyıcıları ilə təmin edilməsinin təhlükəsizliyi və
fasiləsizliyinin təmin edilməsi, ölkənin iqtisadi maraqlarının qorunması;
* dünyada demokratiyanın, qanunun aliliyi prinsipinin yayılması və
möhkəmləndirilməsi, insan hüquqlarının təmin edilməsi üzərində nəzarət;
* yeni münaqişələrin yaranmasının qarşısının alınması, hazırda mövcud olan
münaqişələrin nizamlanmasında iştirak etmək;
* ümumdünya siyasi sisteminin sabitliyinin saxlanılması;
* beynəlxalq terrorizmlə mübarizə;
* ölkə ərazisində terror aktlarının törədilməsinin qarşısının alınması;
* kütləvi qırğın silahlarının yayılmasının qarşısının alınması;
* Birləşmiş Krallığın qeyri-qanuni miqrasiya, narkotiklərin qeyri-qanuni dövriyyəsi,
insan alveri və digər beynəlxalq cinayətlərdən qorunmasının təmin edilməsi;
həmçinin qlobal miqyasda beynəlxalq cinayətkarlığın səviyyəsinin aşağı salınması;
* NATO, Avropa İttifaqı, BMT, G8 çərçivəsində (Böyük səkkizlik) fəal siyasət
aparılması;
* Birləşmiş Krallığın dünya siyasəti məsələlərinə və qlobal problemlərin həllinə
maksimum təsir göstərmək istiqamətində effektiv çoxtərəfli əməkdaşlıq sistemini
dəstəkləməsi;
* BMT Təhlükəsizlik Şurasının islahatlarının dəstəklənməsi;
* Rusiya, Çin, Yaponiya, Hindistan ilə daha sıx əməkdaşlıq münasibətlərinin
qurulması;
* İslam dövlətləri ilə “konstruktiv qarşılıqlı əlaqələr”in qurulması;
* müsəlman dövlətlərində siyasi və sosial islahatların dəstəklənməsi;
* ABŞ və Avropa İttifaqı ölkələri ilə sıx əlaqələrin qurulması;
* Birləşmiş Krallıq üçün beynəlxalq terrorizm təhlükəsinin azaldılması;
* Əfqanıstan və İraqın bərpa olunması prosesində iştirak etməyə davam etmək, Əfqanıstanda opium istehsalının əhəmiyyətli dərəcədə azaldılması və yaxın 10 il
ərzində tamamilə aradan qaldırılması;
* beynəlxalq tərəfdaşlarla qarşılıqlı əlaqələr vasitəsilə Cənubi Asiya, Yaxın Şərq, Balkanlar və digər regionlarda gərginliyin səviyyəsinin azaldılması;
* İran və Şimali Koreyanın nüvə silahı əldə etməsinin qarşısının alınması;
* Birləşmiş Krallığın NATO-nun müasirləşdirilməsi və Avropa İttifaqının müdafiə
imkanlarının təkmilləşdirilməsi yolu ilə Avropada təhlükəsizliyin
möhkəmləndirilməsi;
* ətraf mühitlə bağlı səmərəli siyasətin təmin edilməsi.

Təhlükəsizlik və müdafiə siyasətinin əsas prioritetləri:
* NATO-da fəal iştirak;
* terrorizmi dəstəkləyən ölkələrə nüvə, bakterioloji silah əldə etməyə imkan
verilməməsi;
* kütləvi qırğın silahlarının yayılmasına imkan verilməməsi;
* Birləşmiş Krallığın silahlı qüvvələrinin bu və ya digər böhran zonalarında
yerləşdirilməsi

PS.. Ingilislərin xarici siyasəti ölkənin maraqlarını təmin etməsi üçün yuxarıda göstərdiyim prioritetlərin heç birinə əməl etməyə də bilər.. yəni hədəfə gedən yolda hər şeyi etmək olar düsturu ilə..

UK and US relations with Libya- before Arab Spring


• 1984 UK breaks off diplomatic relations with Libya after the Yvonne Fletcher killing in April outside the Libyan embassy
• 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 is brought down over Lockerbie, Scotland
• 1992 UN imposes sanctions in response to the Lockerbie bombing
• 1999 UK restores diplomatic relations
• 2003 UN lifts sanctions in response to Libya’s undertaking to pay compensation for Lockerbie and the UTA bombing in Chad
• 2004 Tony Blair visits Libya
• 2005 US energy companies return to Libya for an auction of oil exploration licenses
• 2006 US restores full diplomatic relations

• 2007 Tony Blair visits Libya
• 2008 Libya and the United Kingdom sign a prisoners transfer agreement, which allows the return of a prisoner to serve out his sentence in his home country where both jurisdictions are in agreement
• 2009 Abdelbaset al-Megrahi is released on compassionate grounds due to ill health and not as a prisoner transfer
• 2010 - US senators push for inquiry into claims that oil giant BP lobbied for Lockerbie bomber's release. BP begins drilling off Libyan coast.

Police and military training
The UK has been involved in training the Libyan police and military. The Home Office listed the number of police officers that had been sent to Libya since 2004 in a PQ answer:
• 2004: three police officers and one member of police staff from West Yorkshire police delivered a three-week programme on drugs investigation. This was part of a project coordinated by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
• 2008: one police officer from South Wales police delivered a two-week Major Incident Command Programme organised by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA)
• 2008: two police staff members of the NPIA delivered a two-week forensic awareness training programme
• 2009: two police officers (one seconded to the NPIA) from the Police Service of Northern Ireland delivered a three-week Silver Command and Control Programme.44
Military personnel from Libya started training courses in the UK in 2008-09, along with personnel from 105 other countries.
According to a report in the Financial Times, Saadi Qaddafi, one of the Qaddafi sons, said recently that the British government had in 2010 sent SAS forces to eastern Libya to “train our special forces because they were expecting to fight al-Qaeda in this part of the country.”

Arab Spring.. Mohamed Bouazizi 
The consequences of a young unemployed Tunisian, Mohamed Bouazizi, setting himself on fire, continues to reverberate through Tunisia and North Africa. The actual grievance of Mohamed Bouazizi was that when he had tried to sell vegetables to raise some money, on 17 December, he had been prevented by municipal inspectors. This, however, came on top of a long period of intense frustration.

Born:Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi

29 March 1984 Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia

Died 4 January 2011 (aged 26) Ben Arous, Tunisia

Cause of death Burns caused by self-immolation

Resting place Garaat Bennour cemetery

Other names Basboosa

Occupation Street vendor

Known for Self-immolation

He was severely burnt and died two weeks later. News of his death spread on the internet, setting off a chain of demonstrations, catching almost everyone outside Tunisia by surprise. The intense public anger peaked in the capital, Tunis, over the weekend of 8-9 January, leading to the collapse of the government of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, an autocratic regime that had been in power for 23 years.
An interim administration took power, supported by the Army, and this has promised elections within six months. The administration initially had many members drawn from the previous regime and while some of these subsequently stood down, opposition to the inclusion of any former government ministers continued. Significant moves by the interim government included the release of many political prisoners, some of whom had been detained for more than a decade, and a willingness to allow the safe return to Tunisia of some key exiled political leaders, most notably Mr Rashid Ghannouchi, the leader of the banned Islamist party, al-Nahda (no relation to the interim Prime Minister, Mr Mohammed Ghannouchi).
Following the extraordinarily rapid pace of change in Tunisia, massive unrest in Egypt, demonstrations and self-immolations in several other countries across North Africa and the Middle East, questions have been raised over the likelihood that Tunisia heralds a transformation across the region, and whether that will involve the ascendancy of Islamist political parties.

Ərəb Baharı.. yoxsa Ərəb Qışı

 Ərəb Baharı.. yoxsa Ərəb Qışı

Araşdırılması lazım olan önəmli xüsuslardan birincisi bu hadisələrin ölkələr üzrə nəticələrinə baxmaqdır.
Tunis və Misirdə xalq hərəkatı ilə diktatorların hakimiyyətdən getdiyini görürük.
Liviyada isə müxalif qüvvələrin silahlı müqavimət göstərdiyini..
Suriyada isə vətəndaş müharibəsinin halhazırda da davam etdiyini görürük.
İkinci baxılacaq xüsus: hadisələrin ölkələ
r üzrə fərqli və oxşar cəhətlərini analiz etməliyik..

Digər önəmli xüsus xarici ölkələrin təsirini araşdırmaq olmalıdır.
Ərəb ölkələrində baş verən və 21-ci əsrin ən böyük hadisəsi olaraq beynəlxalq münasibətlərə təsir edən xalq hərəkatlarında həm "bahar", həm də "qış" motivlərini görə bilərik..

Bu haqda məqaləmdə ətraflı araşdırma etmişəm..

UK in the Middle East

The ‘Arab Spring’ has been the British coalition government’s first major foreign policy test. Challenges and expectations on both shores are enormous. How can it support processes of political transition in line with core values whilst facing economic austerity at home? Blinkered by a decade of involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, overly Gulf-centred and heavily bilateral, British foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is in a process of reappraisal.

This reappraisal must lead to a consistent narrative of support for political and economic reform in line with EU policy approaches. On the one hand, the UK’s response to the Arab Spring so far has been less ambivalent than other member states. Britain has led in demanding economic sanctions, freezing assets, and implementing NATOcoordinated operations in Libya. Soft power initiatives such as the ‘Arab Partnership’ are laudable approaches, though funding levels, and hence impact potential, remain limited. In order to maximise impact in a region vital to its energy, export and security interests, the UK should seek to feed its experience of decades of bilateral relations with the Gulf countries into the revision of broader EU policies that aim to support political transitions.

On the other hand, the UK is subject to increasing scrutiny for its role in selling weapons to repressive regimes. Faced with an image problem, the UK is seeking to portray its lucrative trade relations with the Gulf as part of Prime Minister David Cameron’s ‘commercial diplomacy’ approach to foreign policy. The government argues that Britain’s national security interests are best served through commercial cooperation with strategic political partners. 

In trying to find the right tone for British foreign policyas popular uprisings spread across the MENA,

Cameron has oscillated from realism to idealism, a balancing act mirroring the Conservative-Liberal

Democrat coalition he leads. The result, ‘muscular liberalism’, is a foreign policy more pragmatic than that of the Blair-Brown years, but not entirely distinct. Cultivating bilateral relations in the ‘networked world’ is essential to avoid what Foreign Secretary William Hague terms ‘strategic shrinkage’.

Yet economic austerity at home, political sidelining at the EU level, and new players vying for influence in the MENA risk widening the discord between Britain’s determination and ability to do so.

UK and Arab Spring
The Arab Spring has demonstrated just how uncertain the world can be. The eruption
of democracy movements across the Middle East and North Africa may turn out to be
the most important development of the early 21st century, providing the international
community with an opportunity to support the development of resilient societies and to
help bring stability to the region.
The Arab Spring has also challenged long standing notions of stability. Challenges to
oppression, if managed peacefully, can be a rejuvenating force for society, unlocking
economic potential and re-enfranchising the disaffected. This strategy is built on the
insight that stability can only be achieved when a society has the strong and legitimate
institutions it needs to manage tensions peacefully.
It seeks to address the lessons we have learnt from these events and marks the first
time that the Government has put in place an integrated cross-government strategy to
address conflict issues. By focusing on Early Warning we will improve our ability to
anticipate instability and potential triggers for conflict. When crises emerge we will act
to deliver rapid crisis prevention and response, improving our ability to take fast,
appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating or spreading.
We will invest in upstream prevention to build strong, legitimate institutions in fragile
countries so that they are capable of managing tensions and shocks.
Implementing the strategy will require a consolidated effort, using all our diplomatic,
development and defence capabilities as well as drawing on external expertise.
Through active expeditionary diplomacy we will build stronger ties with countries we
can work with to promote stability. We will seek to work more closely with existing
international partners and incorporate this agenda into our developing relationships
with the emerging powers. We will use Britain’s weight and influence in institutions
including the United Nations, the European Union, NATO and the International
Financial Institutions.
We have already announced the substantial extra resources which will underpin the
strategy. By 2014/15 we will have increased to 30% the proportion of UK Official
Development Assistance (ODA) that supports fragile and conflict affected states. The
resources of the Conflict Pool, jointly operated by the FCO, DFID and MOD, will rise to
a total of £1.125 billion over the Spending Review Period. The Arab Partnership
initiative will expand to £110 million over the next four years to support political and
economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Working to address instability
and conflict upstream is a sound investment; it is both morally right and in our national
interest.
We will share joint responsibility for the implementation of this strategy which delivers
on the commitment we made in the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence
and Security Review last year.
William Hague
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Andrew Mitchell
Secretary of State for International Development
Dr Liam Fox
Secretary of State for Defence

Ərəb Baharı

Ərəb Baharı; Ərəb xalqlarının demokratiya, azadlıq və insan hüquqları tələblərindən ortaya çıxmış; regional, ictimai bir siyasi-silahlı hərəkatdır. Etirazlar, mitinqlər, nümayişlər və daxili qarşıdurmalar yaşanmışdır. Ərəb Baharı -azadlıq mübarizəsi- ilə bir çox Ərəb diktatoru rəsmən hakimiyyətdən uzaqlaşdırdı.